Multitasking and leadership in optimal incentive contracts

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization Pub Date : 2024-11-28 DOI:10.1016/j.jebo.2024.106824

Kohei Daido , Takeshi Murooka

引用次数: 0

Abstract

We study multitasking problems where an agent engages in both a contractible and a non-contractible task, which are substitutes. The agent has private information on the value of the non-contractible task, and there are followers (e.g., another agent, a third party, or a principal) who also contribute to this task. The agent’s effort can serve as a signal of the value as in the literature on leading-by-example (Hermalin, 1998). We derive the condition in which the principal provides high-powered incentives for the contractible task to mitigate the agent’s excessive signaling.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.80

自引率

9.10%

发文量

392

期刊介绍： The Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization is devoted to theoretical and empirical research concerning economic decision, organization and behavior and to economic change in all its aspects. Its specific purposes are to foster an improved understanding of how human cognitive, computational and informational characteristics influence the working of economic organizations and market economies and how an economy structural features lead to various types of micro and macro behavior, to changing patterns of development and to institutional evolution. Research with these purposes that explore the interrelations of economics with other disciplines such as biology, psychology, law, anthropology, sociology and mathematics is particularly welcome.