Evolutionary game analysis of building a sustainable intelligent elderly care service platform.

Abstract

With the rapid aging of populations and advancements in information technology, the development of intelligent elder-care service platforms (IESPs) has gained momentum. This paper examines the feasibility and strategies for constructing an IESP. Unlike commercial internet platforms, IESP facilitates transactions in elderly care services, which are quasi-public goods requiring government guidance and multi-stakeholder collaboration. Utilizing value co-creation theory, this study constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving a digital technology company, a social organization, and an elderly care service provider to analyze factors influencing stakeholder behavior. The findings reveal that sustained value co-creation is influenced by platform revenue, participation costs, reputation effects, and government subsidies. To optimize outcomes, the government should balance stakeholder interests, ensure reasonable profits for the digital company and social organization, and reduce participation costs through grassroots mobilization, data support, and subsidies for digital transformation. Strengthening reputation management and standardizing service evaluations are also crucial for achieving system equilibrium.