Separating minimal from radical embodied cognitive neuroscience.

IF 2 4区医学 Q3 NEUROSCIENCES

Cognitive Neuroscience Pub Date : 2024-07-01 Epub Date: 2024-09-30 DOI:10.1080/17588928.2024.2405591

Matthieu M de Wit

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Mougenot and Matheson (2024) make a compelling case for the development of a mechanistic cognitive neuroscience that is embodied. However, their analysis of extant work under this header plays down important distinctions between 'minimal' and 'radical' embodiment. The former remains firmly neurocentric and therefore has limited potential to move the needle in understanding the functional contributions of neural dynamics to cognition in the context of wider organism-environment dynamics.

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将最低限度的认知神经科学与激进的具身认知神经科学区分开来。

Mougenot 和 Matheson（2024 年）为发展具身的机械认知神经科学提出了令人信服的理由。然而，他们在这一标题下对现有工作的分析淡化了 "最小 "和 "激进 "体现之间的重要区别。前者仍然以神经为中心，因此在理解神经动态在更广泛的生物体-环境动态背景下对认知的功能贡献方面潜力有限。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Cognitive Neuroscience NEUROSCIENCES-

CiteScore

3.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

>12 weeks

期刊介绍： Cognitive Neuroscience publishes high quality discussion papers and empirical papers on any topic in the field of cognitive neuroscience including perception, attention, memory, language, action, social cognition, and executive function. The journal covers findings based on a variety of techniques such as fMRI, ERPs, MEG, TMS, and focal lesion studies. Contributions that employ or discuss multiple techniques to shed light on the spatial-temporal brain mechanisms underlying a cognitive process are encouraged.