Does analyst forecast informativeness affect managers’ financial reporting incentives?

IF 2.1 4区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Economics Letters Pub Date : 2024-09-24 DOI:10.1016/j.econlet.2024.111995

Kimberly S. Krieg , Ferdinand Siagian , Juan Wu

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This study investigates how the informativeness of analyst forecasts affects managers’ financial reporting incentives. Using a novel Match Index to estimate the earnings management induced by analyst forecasts, we find that when analyst forecasts are less informative, managers place less value on using them as a benchmark and thus, engage in less earnings management to meet that benchmark.

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分析师的预测信息量是否会影响管理者的财务报告动机？

本研究探讨了分析师预测的信息量如何影响管理者的财务报告动机。通过使用新颖的匹配指数来估算分析师预测所引发的收益管理，我们发现，当分析师预测的信息量较少时，管理者会降低将其作为基准的价值，从而减少为达到该基准而进行的收益管理。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

3.20

自引率

5.00%

发文量

348

审稿时长

30 days

期刊介绍： Many economists today are concerned by the proliferation of journals and the concomitant labyrinth of research to be conquered in order to reach the specific information they require. To combat this tendency, Economics Letters has been conceived and designed outside the realm of the traditional economics journal. As a Letters Journal, it consists of concise communications (letters) that provide a means of rapid and efficient dissemination of new results, models and methods in all fields of economic research.