{"title":"The monotonicity of essence","authors":"William Vincent","doi":"10.1007/s11098-024-02214-7","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>Kit Fine’s logic of essence and his reduction of modality crucially rely on a principle called the ‘monotonicity of essence’. This principle says that for all pluralities, <i>xx</i> and <i>yy</i>, if some <i>xx</i> belong to some <i>yy</i>, then if it is essential to <i>xx</i> that<i> p,</i> it is also essential to <i>yy</i> that <i>p</i>. I argue that on the constitutive notion of essence, this principle is false. In particular, I show that this principle is false because it says that some propositions are essential to <i>yy</i> even though those propositions are only about some of its members. I then consider modifications to the principle appealing to consequential essence and argue that such a modification is inconsistent with a central desideratum of Fine’s approach to metaphysics, what I call his neutrality condition.</p>","PeriodicalId":48305,"journal":{"name":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2024-09-19","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s11098-024-02214-7","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"哲学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Kit Fine’s logic of essence and his reduction of modality crucially rely on a principle called the ‘monotonicity of essence’. This principle says that for all pluralities, xx and yy, if some xx belong to some yy, then if it is essential to xx that p, it is also essential to yy that p. I argue that on the constitutive notion of essence, this principle is false. In particular, I show that this principle is false because it says that some propositions are essential to yy even though those propositions are only about some of its members. I then consider modifications to the principle appealing to consequential essence and argue that such a modification is inconsistent with a central desideratum of Fine’s approach to metaphysics, what I call his neutrality condition.
柯特-费恩的本质逻辑和他的模态还原关键依赖于一个叫做 "本质的单调性 "的原则。这个原则说，对于所有复数，xx 和 yy，如果某些 xx 属于某些 yy，那么如果 p 对 xx 至关重要，那么 p 对 yy 也至关重要。特别是，我证明这个原则是错误的，因为它说某些命题对yy是必不可少的，尽管这些命题只是关于yy的某些成员。然后，我考虑了对诉诸结果性本质的原则的修改，并论证了这样的修改与费恩的形而上学方法的核心要求--我称之为他的中立性条件--是不一致的。
期刊介绍：
Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy.
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