Dangers Behind Charging VR Devices: Hidden Side Channel Attacks via Charging Cables

IF 6.3 1区 计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, THEORY & METHODS
Jiachun Li;Yan Meng;Yuxia Zhan;Le Zhang;Haojin Zhu
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Abstract

Virtual reality (VR), offering 3D visuals and stereophonic sounds, significantly enhances users’ immersive experiences and has become a milestone in the era of the metaverse. However, due to the limited battery capacity of VR devices, it is common for users to rely on charging cables, which serve the dual purpose of power supply and audio output, to recharge their VR devices while in use. In this study, we propose an inconspicuous and stealthy side channel attack, coined as LineTalker, which can unveil visual-related and audio-related activities from VR devices during the charging process. The insight behind LineTalker is rooted in the observation that visual-related activities (e.g., 3D image rendering) are power-intensive and result in fluctuations in the current strength of the cable’s power supply line, which can be leveraged as side channel information. Similarly, audio-related activities (e.g., playing music) leave traces on the cable’s audio output line. Rather than providing a user with a compromised charging cable (i.e., embedding a current sensor) to measure the current strength, to make the attack less conspicuous, LineTalker employs the Hall effect to indirectly access side channel information. This is achieved by capturing magnetic signals using a Hall sensor placed near the target cable in a contactless manner. Experimental results demonstrate that LineTalker achieves an overall accuracy of 94.60% and 64.38% in inferring user activities in VR devices with intrusive and non-intrusive attack manners, respectively.
VR 设备充电背后的危险:通过充电电缆的隐藏侧通道攻击
虚拟现实(VR)提供三维视觉效果和立体声音效,极大地增强了用户的沉浸式体验,已成为元宇宙时代的一个里程碑。然而,由于 VR 设备的电池容量有限,用户在使用 VR 设备时通常需要依赖充电线缆为其充电,而充电线缆具有供电和音频输出的双重功能。在本研究中,我们提出了一种不显眼且隐蔽的侧信道攻击(称为 LineTalker),它可以揭示 VR 设备在充电过程中与视觉和音频相关的活动。LineTalker 背后的洞察力源于这样一种观察:与视觉相关的活动(如 3D 图像渲染)是耗电的,会导致电缆供电线路的电流强度波动,而这些波动可以作为侧信道信息加以利用。同样,与音频相关的活动(如播放音乐)也会在电缆的音频输出线路上留下痕迹。为了使攻击不那么显眼,LineTalker 没有向用户提供被破坏的充电线(即嵌入电流传感器)来测量电流强度,而是利用霍尔效应来间接获取侧信道信息。为此,LineTalker 采用了霍尔效应来间接获取侧信道信息,具体方法是利用放置在目标电缆附近的霍尔传感器,以非接触方式捕捉磁信号。实验结果表明,LineTalker 在以侵入式和非侵入式攻击方式推断 VR 设备中的用户活动时,总体准确率分别达到 94.60% 和 64.38%。
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来源期刊
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security 工程技术-工程:电子与电气
CiteScore
14.40
自引率
7.40%
发文量
234
审稿时长
6.5 months
期刊介绍: The IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security covers the sciences, technologies, and applications relating to information forensics, information security, biometrics, surveillance and systems applications that incorporate these features
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