Dissolving the moral-conventional distinction

IF 1.4 3区哲学 Q2 ETHICS

Philosophical Psychology Pub Date : 2024-09-05 DOI:10.1080/09515089.2024.2395368

David C. Sackris

引用次数: 0

Abstract

One way in which philosophers have often sought to distinguish moral judgments from non-moral judgments is by using the “moral-conventional” distinction. I seek to raise serious questions about the...

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打破道德与传统的界限

哲学家们经常试图用 "道德-常规 "的区别来区分道德判断与非道德判断。我试图就 "道德-常规 "的区别提出严肃的问题。

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来源期刊

Philosophical Psychology Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

14.30%

发文量

120

期刊介绍： Philosophical Psychology is an international journal devoted to developing and strengthening the links between philosophy and the psychological sciences, both as basic sciences and as employed in applied settings, by publishing original, peer-refereed contributions to this expanding field of study and research. Published articles deal with issues that arise in the cognitive and brain sciences, and in areas of applied psychology.