{"title":"Balance of power in a conflict model","authors":"Ryota Tsuchiya","doi":"10.1007/s10101-024-00318-8","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>This study provides a microeconomic foundation for the bipolar stability hypothesis in international politics. It extends the well-designed conflict model of Esteban and Ray (Am Econ Rev 101(4):1345–1374, 2011) to include monetary compensation arrangements between the winning and losing groups, presenting a new conflict-related indicator called the balance of power index. The main finding of this study is that societal polarization serves to alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict intensity, which is elucidated by the balance of power index. This new characteristic of polarization is associated with the founding of the bipolar stability hypothesis by Waltz (J Int Affairs 21(2):215–231, 1967), Waltz (Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1979) under the economic behavioral model.</p>","PeriodicalId":46302,"journal":{"name":"Economics of Governance","volume":"62 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.2000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-30","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Economics of Governance","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-024-00318-8","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
This study provides a microeconomic foundation for the bipolar stability hypothesis in international politics. It extends the well-designed conflict model of Esteban and Ray (Am Econ Rev 101(4):1345–1374, 2011) to include monetary compensation arrangements between the winning and losing groups, presenting a new conflict-related indicator called the balance of power index. The main finding of this study is that societal polarization serves to alleviate rather than exacerbate conflict intensity, which is elucidated by the balance of power index. This new characteristic of polarization is associated with the founding of the bipolar stability hypothesis by Waltz (J Int Affairs 21(2):215–231, 1967), Waltz (Theory of international politics. Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, Reading, 1979) under the economic behavioral model.
本研究为国际政治中的两极稳定假说提供了微观经济学基础。它扩展了埃斯特班和雷（Am Econ Rev 101(4)：1345-1374，2011 年）精心设计的冲突模型，将胜败双方的货币补偿安排纳入其中，提出了一个与冲突相关的新指标--均势指数。本研究的主要发现是，社会两极分化会缓解而非加剧冲突强度，这一点已被权力平衡指数所阐明。两极分化的这一新特征与华尔兹（J Int Affairs 21(2):215-231, 1967）、华尔兹（Theory of international politics.Addison-Wesley Publishing Company，Reading，1979）在经济行为模式下提出的。
期刊介绍：
Economics of Governance aims to foster research on governance at many levels: corporations, non-profit organizations, local and federal governments, and international organizations. Applications include the internal organization of firms, corporate governance, the private provision of public goods, local public policies, relations across levels of government, public expenditure and regulation, and problems of credibility and enforcement of international agreements. Though the journal aims to contribute to general economic knowledge, it is also interested in applying theoretical and empirical insights to important current topics. The journal is open to many approaches, including formal theoretical analysis, systematic observation, simulation, and empirical studies. Interdisciplinary contributions by economists, organizational scholars, and political scientists are encouraged.
Officially cited as: Econ Gov
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
