Bureacractic costs and firm behavior

IF 1.2 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Applied Economics Letters Pub Date : 2024-08-21 DOI:10.1080/13504851.2024.2390975

John E. Anderson

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This note sketches the theory of how bureaucratic costs can affect firm behaviour resulting in inefficiency and corruption. The canonical competitive model of the firm maximizing output subject to ...

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固定成本与企业行为

本说明概述了官僚成本如何影响企业行为，从而导致效率低下和腐败的理论。典型的竞争模型是，企业在受制于官僚成本的情况下实现产出最大化。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Applied Economics Letters ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.90

自引率

6.20%

发文量

460

期刊介绍： Applied Economics Letters is a companion journal to Applied Economics and Applied Financial Economics. It publishes short accounts of new original research and encourages discussion of papers previously published in its two companion journals. Letters are reviewed by the Editor, a member of the Editorial Board or another suitable authority. They are generally applied in nature, but may include discussion of method and theoretical formulation. In a change to the format of the Applied Financial Series of journals, from 2009 Applied Financial Economics Letters will be incorporated into its sister journal Applied Economics Letters.