A bargaining game for implementing the equal gain splitting rule in sequencing situations

IF 0.8 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2024-09-05 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2024.107182

Guangjing Yang

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper investigates non-cooperative behavior in single-machine scheduling and aims to implement the equal gain splitting (EGS) rule via a designed bargaining game. In this game, randomly chosen proposers make offers that coalition members can accept or reject, with the goal of reaching subgame perfect equilibria that align with the EGS rule. Additionally, we extend the game to implement the weighted gain splitting (WGS) rule, which is a generalization of the EGS rule considering players' weights.

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在排序情况下实施等额收益分割规则的讨价还价游戏

本文研究了单机调度中的非合作行为，旨在通过设计的讨价还价博弈实现等额收益分配（EGS）规则。在这个博弈中，随机选择的提议者提出提议，联盟成员可以接受或拒绝，目标是达到与 EGS 规则一致的子博弈完美均衡。此外，我们还对博弈进行了扩展，以实现加权收益分割（WGS）规则，这是对 EGS 规则的一般化，考虑了参与者的权重。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.