Sensing-Resistant Jamming: A Novel Physical Layer Attack in ISAC Networks

Abstract

The landscape of future mobile devices is poised for an organic fusion of sensing and communication, a trend known as integrated sensing and communication. In this letter, we stand in attacker’s perspective and conceive a novel physical layer attack termed sensing-resistant jamming (SRJ), aiming at maximally disrupting the suspicious transmission while deceiving receiver’s detection of the attacker’s direction simultaneously. To evaluate the sensing-resistant performance, a metric named angular-domain peak-to-average ratio (ADPAR) is defined and further analyzed through the generalized Rayleigh quotient. Then, the SRJ design is formulated by minimizing the achievable rate under ADPAR constraints, which is converted to a convex problem and solved by the projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm. In order to further reduce the computational complexity, we also provide a sub-optimal closed-form solution. Simulation results illustrate the feasibility of the conceived SRJ design, where the attacker’s direction can be concealed while maintaining the achievable rate to a low level.