{"title":"A social monitoring mechanism for third-party judges promotes cooperation in evolutionary games","authors":"","doi":"10.1016/j.amc.2024.128991","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Corruption of third-party judges seriously undermines the level of cooperation. Without intervention, more corruptors and defectors would emerge, disrupting social harmony. Therefore, introducing an anti-corruption mechanism is crucial for the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we propose a social monitoring mechanism to monitor third-party judges so that their payoffs are affected by the proportions of cooperators. Monte Carlo simulations on periodic boundary lattices. The results show that the social monitoring mechanism is effective in promoting cooperation and inhibiting corruption, and enhances the effectiveness of zealots in promoting cooperation. This facilitation effect is not only manifested in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game but also in the Snowdrift Game, which confirms the robustness of the results. Our research provides new insights for solving social dilemmas and curbing corruption.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":55496,"journal":{"name":"Applied Mathematics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-08-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Applied Mathematics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"100","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0096300324004521","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"数学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"MATHEMATICS, APPLIED","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Corruption of third-party judges seriously undermines the level of cooperation. Without intervention, more corruptors and defectors would emerge, disrupting social harmony. Therefore, introducing an anti-corruption mechanism is crucial for the evolution of cooperation. In this paper, we propose a social monitoring mechanism to monitor third-party judges so that their payoffs are affected by the proportions of cooperators. Monte Carlo simulations on periodic boundary lattices. The results show that the social monitoring mechanism is effective in promoting cooperation and inhibiting corruption, and enhances the effectiveness of zealots in promoting cooperation. This facilitation effect is not only manifested in the Prisoner's Dilemma Game but also in the Snowdrift Game, which confirms the robustness of the results. Our research provides new insights for solving social dilemmas and curbing corruption.
期刊介绍：
Applied Mathematics and Computation addresses work at the interface between applied mathematics, numerical computation, and applications of systems – oriented ideas to the physical, biological, social, and behavioral sciences, and emphasizes papers of a computational nature focusing on new algorithms, their analysis and numerical results.
In addition to presenting research papers, Applied Mathematics and Computation publishes review articles and single–topics issues.
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