Memory and target payoff enhance cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas.

IF 2.7 2区 数学 Q1 MATHEMATICS, APPLIED
Chaos Pub Date : 2024-08-01 DOI:10.1063/5.0220490
Xinle Lin, Jianhe Li, Suohai Fan
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

We proposed a neighbor selection mechanism based on memory and target payoff, where the target payoff is the maximum value of the group's average expected payoff. According to this mechanism, individuals prioritize selecting neighbors whose average payoffs in the last M rounds are close to the target payoff for strategy learning, aiming to maximize the group's expected payoff. Simulation results on the grid-based Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift games demonstrate that this mechanism can significantly improve the group's payoff and cooperation level. Furthermore, the longer the memory length, the higher the group's payoff and cooperation level. Overall, the combination of memory and target payoff can lead to the emergence and persistence of cooperation in social dilemmas as individuals are motivated to cooperate based on both their past experiences and future goals. This interplay highlights the significance of taking into account numerous variables in comprehending and promoting cooperation within evolutionary frameworks.

记忆和目标报酬增强了进化社会困境中的合作。
我们提出了一种基于记忆和目标报酬的邻居选择机制,其中目标报酬是群体平均预期报酬的最大值。根据这一机制,个体会优先选择在过去 M 轮中平均报酬接近目标报酬的邻居进行策略学习,从而实现群体预期报酬的最大化。基于网格的囚徒困境和雪漂游戏的模拟结果表明,这种机制能显著提高群体的收益和合作水平。此外,记忆长度越长,小组的收益和合作水平就越高。总之,记忆和目标报酬的结合可以导致社会困境中合作的出现和持续,因为个体的合作动机是基于他们过去的经验和未来的目标。这种相互作用凸显了在进化框架内理解和促进合作时考虑众多变量的重要性。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
Chaos
Chaos 物理-物理:数学物理
CiteScore
5.20
自引率
13.80%
发文量
448
审稿时长
2.3 months
期刊介绍: Chaos: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Nonlinear Science is a peer-reviewed journal devoted to increasing the understanding of nonlinear phenomena and describing the manifestations in a manner comprehensible to researchers from a broad spectrum of disciplines.
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