DoS attacks resilience of heterogeneous complex networks via dynamic event-triggered impulsive scheme for secure quasi-synchronization

Abstract

This paper addresses the secure quasi-synchronization issue of heterogeneous complex networks (HCNs) under aperiodic denial-of-service (DoS) attacks with dynamic event-triggered impulsive scheme (ETIS). The heterogeneity of networks and the aperiodic DoS attacks, which hinder communication channels and synchronization goals, present challenges to the analysis of secure quasi-synchronization. The ETIS leverages impulsive control and dynamic event-triggered scheme (ETS) to handle the network heterogeneity and the DoS attacks. We give specific bounds on the attack duration and frequency that the network can endure, and obtain synchronization criteria that relate to event parameters, attack duration, attack frequency, and impulsive gain by the variation of parameter formula and recursive methods. Moreover, we prove that the dynamic ETS significantly reduces the controller updates, saves energy without sacrificing the system decay rate, and prevents the Zeno phenomenon. Finally, we validate our control scheme with a numerical example.