Parity, faultlessness and relativism: A response to Wright and Ferrari

IF 1.1 1区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

ANALYSIS Pub Date : 2024-07-04 DOI:10.1093/analys/anad107

Dan Zeman

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Crispin Wright and Filippo Ferrari have accused relativism of not accounting for ‘parity’ – the idea that, when we argue over matters of taste, we take our opponents’ opinions to be ‘as good as ours’ from our own committed perspective. In this paper, I show that (i) explaining parity has not been taken to be a desideratum by relativists and thus they cannot be accused of failing to fulfil a promise; (ii) Wright’s and Ferrari’s reasons for claiming that parity should be a desideratum are unconvincing.

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平等、无缺陷和相对主义：对赖特和法拉利的回应

克里斯平-赖特（Crispin Wright）和菲利波-法拉利（Filippo Ferrari）指责相对主义没有考虑到 "同等性"--即当我们就品味问题进行争论时，我们从自己坚定的角度出发，将对手的观点视为 "与我们的观点一样好"。在本文中，我将证明：(i) 相对主义者并没有把解释同等性当作必要条件，因此不能指责他们没有履行承诺；(ii) 赖特和法拉利声称同等性应该是必要条件的理由并不令人信服。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

ANALYSIS PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

12.50%

发文量

期刊介绍： Analysis is the most established and esteemed forum in which to publish short discussions of topics in philosophy. Articles published in Analysis lend themselves to the presentation of cogent but brief arguments for substantive conclusions, and often give rise to discussions which continue over several interchanges. A wide range of topics are covered including: philosophical logic and philosophy of language, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of mind, and moral philosophy.