Social kind realism as relative frame manipulability

IF 1.1 1区 哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY
Yorgos Karagiannopoulos, Alexios Stamatiadis-Bréhier
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Abstract

In this paper we introduce the view that realism about a social kind K entails that the grounding conditions of K are difficult (or impossible) to manipulate. In other words, we define social kind realism in terms of relative frame manipulability (RFM). In articulating our view, we utilize theoretical resources from Epstein’s (Epstein, The ant trap: Rebuilding the foundations of the Social Sciences. Oxford University Press, 2015) grounding/anchoring model and causal interventionism. After comparing our view with causal and principle-based (Tahko, Synthese 200(2):1–23, 2022) proposals, we motivate RFM by showing that it accommodates important desiderata about the social landscape (such as recognizing the context-relativity of social properties and the emancipatory dimension of social practice). Finally, we consider three objections. First, we tackle frame-necessitarianism (FN), the view that social kind frames are metaphysically necessary (and thus unmanipulable). Secondly, we engage with what Epstein (Epstein, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 99(3):768–781 2019a) calls UNIVERSALITY (the view that social kinds can hold in the absence of anchors) and we argue that it should also be resisted. Finally, we tackle a recent objection from Mason’s (Mason, Philosophical Studies, 178(12):3975–3994) essentialism about social kinds.

作为相对框架可操作性的社会类现实主义
在本文中,我们提出了这样一种观点,即关于社会类型 K 的现实主义意味着 K 的基础条件难以(或不可能)操纵。换句话说,我们用相对框架可操纵性(RFM)来定义社会类型现实主义。在阐述我们的观点时,我们利用了爱泼斯坦(Epstein, The ant trap:牛津大学出版社,2015 年)的理论资源。牛津大学出版社,2015 年)的基础/锚定模型和因果干预主义。在将我们的观点与因果论和原则论(Tahko,Synthese 200(2):1-23,2022)的建议进行比较之后,我们通过证明RFM容纳了关于社会景观的重要理想(如承认社会属性的语境相关性和社会实践的解放维度),来激励RFM。最后,我们考虑了三种反对意见。首先,我们讨论了框架必要论(FN),即认为社会种类框架在形而上学上是必要的(因而是不可操纵的)。其次,我们讨论了爱泼斯坦(Epstein,Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,99(3):768-781 2019a)所谓的 "普遍性"(UNIVERSALITY,即社会种类在没有锚的情况下也能成立的观点),我们认为也应该抵制这种观点。最后,我们讨论了梅森(Mason,《哲学研究》,178(12):3975-3994)最近提出的关于社会类型的本质主义的反对意见。
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来源期刊
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES
PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES PHILOSOPHY-
CiteScore
2.60
自引率
7.70%
发文量
127
期刊介绍: Philosophical Studies was founded in 1950 by Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars to provide a periodical dedicated to work in analytic philosophy. The journal remains devoted to the publication of papers in exclusively analytic philosophy. Papers applying formal techniques to philosophical problems are welcome. The principal aim is to publish articles that are models of clarity and precision in dealing with significant philosophical issues. It is intended that readers of the journal will be kept abreast of the central issues and problems of contemporary analytic philosophy. Double-blind review procedure The journal follows a double-blind reviewing procedure. Authors are therefore requested to place their name and affiliation on a separate page. Self-identifying citations and references in the article text should either be avoided or left blank when manuscripts are first submitted. Authors are responsible for reinserting self-identifying citations and references when manuscripts are prepared for final submission.
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