{"title":"Show Me the Money! Supply and Demand Misalignment for Tangible Rewards in Business*","authors":"Kyle M. Stubbs, Jeremiah W. Bentley","doi":"10.1111/1911-3838.12364","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div>\n \n <p>In incentive contracts, supervisors often set targets for employee performance, while employees decide the effort they are willing to exert to meet the target and earn the incentive. Both supervisors and employees make judgments about the value of incentives in terms of effort required or expended. Recent research on incentive types investigates employee effort in response to tangible and cash rewards under the premise that they may be valued differently by employees. We extend this research by investigating whether supervisors and employees make different effort-related decisions in response to tangible and cash rewards. Specifically, relying on construal-level theory, we predict that supervisors will favor tangible rewards relative to cash more than employees will. We conduct a lab experiment where we ask participants to take the role of either supervisor or employee. We manipulate the reward type (tangible or cash) and measure how much work supervisors demand and employees are willing to provide to obtain the reward. As predicted, we find that the tangible rewards, relative to cash, increase supervisors' target setting significantly more than employee effort levels. Our results offer implications for real-world incentive compensation design.</p>\n </div>","PeriodicalId":43435,"journal":{"name":"Accounting Perspectives","volume":"23 3","pages":"447-465"},"PeriodicalIF":1.6000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Accounting Perspectives","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/1911-3838.12364","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
In incentive contracts, supervisors often set targets for employee performance, while employees decide the effort they are willing to exert to meet the target and earn the incentive. Both supervisors and employees make judgments about the value of incentives in terms of effort required or expended. Recent research on incentive types investigates employee effort in response to tangible and cash rewards under the premise that they may be valued differently by employees. We extend this research by investigating whether supervisors and employees make different effort-related decisions in response to tangible and cash rewards. Specifically, relying on construal-level theory, we predict that supervisors will favor tangible rewards relative to cash more than employees will. We conduct a lab experiment where we ask participants to take the role of either supervisor or employee. We manipulate the reward type (tangible or cash) and measure how much work supervisors demand and employees are willing to provide to obtain the reward. As predicted, we find that the tangible rewards, relative to cash, increase supervisors' target setting significantly more than employee effort levels. Our results offer implications for real-world incentive compensation design.
期刊介绍:
Accounting Perspectives provides a forum for peer-reviewed applied research, analysis, synthesis and commentary on issues of interest to academics, practitioners, financial analysts, financial executives, regulators, accounting policy makers and accounting students. Articles are sought from academics and practitioners that address relevant issues in any and all areas of accounting and related fields, including financial accounting and reporting, auditing and other assurance services, management accounting and performance measurement, information systems and related technologies, tax policy and practice, professional ethics, accounting education, and related topics. Without limiting the generality of the foregoing.