Not all is lost: Sorting and self-stabilizing sets

IF 1 3区 经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Esteban Peralta
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

It is well known that in the absence of transfers, stable matchings are positive assortative when agents' preferences are strictly monotonic in each other's types and types are commonly known. Instead, monotonicity is consistent with the existence of stable matchings that exhibit negative sorting when types on one side of the market are private information. This paper sheds light on the scope and meaning of this consistency by showing that within familiar monotonic markets we cannot conclude that a stable matching is negative, and not positive, assortative.

并非一无所获分类和自稳定集合
众所周知,在没有转移的情况下,如果代理人对彼此类型的偏好是严格单调的,并且类型是众所周知的,那么稳定匹配就是正同类匹配。相反,当市场一方的类型属于私人信息时,单调性与表现出负排序的稳定匹配的存在是一致的。本文通过证明在熟悉的单调性市场中,我们不能得出稳定匹配是负同类而非正同类的结论,从而揭示了这种一致性的范围和含义。
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来源期刊
CiteScore
1.90
自引率
9.10%
发文量
148
期刊介绍: Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology
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