Bribe-Switching

IF 0.5 Q4 ECONOMICS

PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW Pub Date : 2024-04-29 DOI:10.1177/10911421241248719

Jamie Bologna Pavlik, Desiree Desierto

引用次数: 0

Abstract

The US Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) prohibits the payment of bribes to foreign public officials. We uncover an unintended consequence—the shadow economies of the countries of these officials increase after FCPA enforcement. Our hypothesis is that corrupt officials may be switching to taking bribes from illegal markets. We find that one case of FCPA enforcement alone increases the shadow economy by as much as 0.27 percentage points (pp), tree loss—an indicator of illegal logging—by 0.027 pp, and trade misinvoicing by 0.5 pp. Our results suggest the need to harmonize anti-corruption policies across all sectors—legal and illegal.

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贿赂转换

美国《反海外腐败法》（FCPA）禁止向外国公职人员行贿。我们发现了一个意想不到的后果--《反海外腐败法》实施后，这些官员所在国的影子经济增加了。我们的假设是，腐败官员可能会转而从非法市场受贿。我们发现，单单执行《反海外腐败法》就会使影子经济增加多达 0.27 个百分点（pp），树木损失--非法伐木的指标--增加 0.027 个百分点，贸易虚开增加 0.5 个百分点。我们的研究结果表明，有必要协调所有部门--合法和非法部门--的反腐败政策。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

PUBLIC FINANCE REVIEW ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Public Finance Review is a professional forum devoted to US policy-oriented economic research and theory, which focuses on a variety of allocation, distribution and stabilization functions within the public-sector economy. Economists, policy makers, political scientists, and researchers all rely on Public Finance Review, to bring them the most up-to-date information on the ever changing US public finance system, and to help them put policies and research into action. Public Finance Review not only presents rigorous empirical and theoretical papers on public economic policies, but also examines and critiques their impact and consequences. The journal analyzes the nature and function of evolving US governmental fiscal policies at the national, state and local levels.