Electoral institutions and repression in dictatorships

IF 2.9 2区 社会学 Q1 POLITICAL SCIENCE
Chao-Yo Cheng , Yuree Noh
{"title":"Electoral institutions and repression in dictatorships","authors":"Chao-Yo Cheng ,&nbsp;Yuree Noh","doi":"10.1016/j.electstud.2024.102791","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>We argue that the relationship between authoritarian elections and repression depends on the electoral system in use. Proportional representation (PR) systems co-opt more heterogeneous political groups to contest and receive seats in the legislature and thus, dictators are less likely to use broad-based repression. Under plurality rules, by contrast, the regime has more incentives to mobilize turnout and deter collective action. Examining electoral systems from 1990 to 2010, we find that elections only reduce broad-based repression under PR systems, which are less commonly used in non-democracies. Our results highlight the importance of formal institutions in shaping political outcomes even in dictatorships.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":48188,"journal":{"name":"Electoral Studies","volume":"89 ","pages":"Article 102791"},"PeriodicalIF":2.9000,"publicationDate":"2024-05-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424000490/pdfft?md5=fe1d90e7edb442e650bd1683f30f6b5d&pid=1-s2.0-S0261379424000490-main.pdf","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Electoral Studies","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379424000490","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0

Abstract

We argue that the relationship between authoritarian elections and repression depends on the electoral system in use. Proportional representation (PR) systems co-opt more heterogeneous political groups to contest and receive seats in the legislature and thus, dictators are less likely to use broad-based repression. Under plurality rules, by contrast, the regime has more incentives to mobilize turnout and deter collective action. Examining electoral systems from 1990 to 2010, we find that elections only reduce broad-based repression under PR systems, which are less commonly used in non-democracies. Our results highlight the importance of formal institutions in shaping political outcomes even in dictatorships.

独裁政权的选举机构和镇压
我们认为,专制选举与镇压之间的关系取决于所采用的选举制度。比例代表制(PR)可以吸纳更多不同的政治团体参与竞选并获得立法机构的席位,因此独裁者不太可能使用基础广泛的镇压手段。相比之下,在多元化规则下,政权有更多的动机来动员投票率并阻止集体行动。通过研究 1990 年至 2010 年的选举制度,我们发现只有在非民主国家较少使用的公投制度下,选举才会减少基础广泛的镇压。我们的结果凸显了正式制度在塑造政治结果方面的重要性,即使在独裁国家也是如此。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
求助全文
约1分钟内获得全文 求助全文
来源期刊
Electoral Studies
Electoral Studies POLITICAL SCIENCE-
CiteScore
3.40
自引率
13.00%
发文量
82
审稿时长
67 days
期刊介绍: Electoral Studies is an international journal covering all aspects of voting, the central act in the democratic process. Political scientists, economists, sociologists, game theorists, geographers, contemporary historians and lawyers have common, and overlapping, interests in what causes voters to act as they do, and the consequences. Electoral Studies provides a forum for these diverse approaches. It publishes fully refereed papers, both theoretical and empirical, on such topics as relationships between votes and seats, and between election outcomes and politicians reactions; historical, sociological, or geographical correlates of voting behaviour; rational choice analysis of political acts, and critiques of such analyses.
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信