The Constitution of Virtual Objects

Q4 Social Sciences

Dialogue Pub Date : 2024-04-04 DOI:10.1017/s0012217324000155

Guillaume Bucchioni, Alexandre Declos

引用次数: 0

Abstract

David Chalmers argues that virtual reality is a genuine kind of reality. In one of its readings, this “virtual realism” states that virtual entities ontologically depend on real digital entities. This article explores that suggestion and offers a novel account of the dependence of the virtual on the digital. Drawing on Lynne Rudder Baker's theory of constitution, we contend that virtual objects should be seen as constituted by digital objects, when these are placed in certain favourable circumstances. We explore the rationale and implications of this view, which we see as a promising form of virtual realism.

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虚拟物体的构成

戴维-查莫斯认为，虚拟现实是一种真正的现实。这种 "虚拟现实主义 "的一种解读是，虚拟实体在本体论上依赖于真实的数字实体。本文探讨了这一观点，并对虚拟对数字的依赖性进行了新颖的阐述。借鉴林恩-鲁德-贝克的构成理论，我们认为，当虚拟对象被置于某些有利环境中时，它们应被视为由数字对象构成。我们探讨了这一观点的依据和含义，并将其视为一种有前途的虚拟现实主义形式。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Dialogue Social Sciences-Development

CiteScore

0.10

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Dialogue is the official journal of the Canadian Philosophical Association. Its purpose is to publish high quality peer-reviewed scholarly articles, book symposia, critical notices, and book reviews in English and in French, in support of the Association"s mandate to promote philosophical scholarship and education. It is open to contributions in all branches of philosophy and from any philosophical perspective. Readers include professional teachers of philosophy, graduate students, and others with an interest in the field. Published for the Canadian Philosophical Association