Voting with Their Guns: An Integrated Framework of How Police Politically Administer Violence

Abstract

Most analyses of the intersection of police, politics, and violence—which center on the police’s use of force as a means to control subordinate classes, repress political dissidents, or confront non-state armed actors—conceptualize the police as an instrument of political incumbents. In this paper, I problematize the relationship between the police and its political principals by focusing on how police administer violence as a political response in compliance or defiance of political incumbents. While elected officials may enact policy changes that restrain or incite police violence, police forces can either abide with or disregard these directives. Building on this interaction of policy shifts and police responses, I develop a typology of four variants of police administration of violence: peacekeeping, punishing, shirking, and sabotaging. I illustrate this typology with various examples from developed and developing democracies.