The Conditionality of Political Short-Termism: The Case of Climate Policymaking in Democracies

Abstract

The literature on political short-termism holds that multiple factors in current democratic systems drive political short-termism, leading to delays in government responses to long-term policy challenges, such as global climate change. In this article, I argue that these factors do not necessarily work as drivers of political short-termism. To show this, I first review the literature on political short-termism and identify electoral cycles, voters’ policy preferences, and interest-group behavior as potential drivers of political short-termism. I then examine the influence of these potential drivers of political short-termism on climate policymaking, drawing on recent empirical studies. I find that elected governments and politicians can, in some cases, (1) have incentives to pursue climate policies in the run-up to elections, (2) build public support for climate policies, and (3) overcome organized opposition to climate legislation. These findings suggest that although electoral cycles, voters’ policy preferences, and interest-group behavior may induce political short-termism, such negative effects on policymaking are conditional on other variables.