Collusion, shading, internal and external auditing in the simple hierarchical agency

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics Pub Date : 2024-04-16 DOI:10.1080/16081625.2024.2342375

Yutaka Suzuki

引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper introduces a model combining “shading” from behavioral contract theory and collusion in hierarchical organizations to analyze optimal auditing strategies. It investigates whether interna...

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简单层级机构中的串通、阴影、内部和外部审计

本文介绍了一个结合行为契约理论中的 "阴影 "和层级组织中的串通的模型，以分析最优审计策略。该模型研究了内部审计与外部审计之间是否存在...

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics (APJAE) is an international forum intended for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of economics and accounting in general. In particular, the journal encourages submissions in the following areas: Auditing, financial reporting, earnings management, financial analysts, the role of accounting information, international trade and finance, industrial organization, strategic behavior, market structure, financial contracts, corporate governance, capital markets, and financial institutions. The journal welcomes contributions related to the Asia Pacific region, and targets top quality research from scholars with diverse regional interests. The editors encourage submission of high quality manuscripts with innovative ideas. The editorial team is committed to an expedient review process.