Framing Effect in Vertex Cover of Networks Under Prospect Theory

IF 4 3区计算机科学 Q1 COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS

IEEE Systems Journal Pub Date : 2024-03-21 DOI:10.1109/JSYST.2024.3374761

Jie Chen;Changlei Zhan;Ke Xu;Rongpei Zhou

{"title":"Framing Effect in Vertex Cover of Networks Under Prospect Theory","authors":"Jie Chen;Changlei Zhan;Ke Xu;Rongpei Zhou","doi":"10.1109/JSYST.2024.3374761","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Vertex cover (VC) problem is an important combinatorial optimization problem that has a wide range of applications. In this article, we investigate the existing works on solving the VC problem from game theoretic perspective; these works treated each vertex of a network as a completely rational player. In contrast, we consider the impact of player's subjective behavior, that is, each player is not necessarily completely rational. First, we establish a game model under the expected utility theory (EUT) and the framing effect (FE) of the prospect theory. Second, we analyze the relationship between VC and game model under the EUT and the FE. Third, we propose a relaxed greedy behavioral algorithm, and prove that our proposed algorithm can guarantee that the strategies of all vertices converge to a strict Nash equilibrium under the EUT and the FE. Finally, the simulation results not only evaluate the influence of FE on the overall cover level of networks but also demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our proposed algorithm compared with the existing bounded rationality algorithm on representative networks and standard benchmark.","PeriodicalId":55017,"journal":{"name":"IEEE Systems Journal","volume":"18 2","pages":"1092-1103"},"PeriodicalIF":4.0000,"publicationDate":"2024-03-21","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"IEEE Systems Journal","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/10477775/","RegionNum":3,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Vertex cover (VC) problem is an important combinatorial optimization problem that has a wide range of applications. In this article, we investigate the existing works on solving the VC problem from game theoretic perspective; these works treated each vertex of a network as a completely rational player. In contrast, we consider the impact of player's subjective behavior, that is, each player is not necessarily completely rational. First, we establish a game model under the expected utility theory (EUT) and the framing effect (FE) of the prospect theory. Second, we analyze the relationship between VC and game model under the EUT and the FE. Third, we propose a relaxed greedy behavioral algorithm, and prove that our proposed algorithm can guarantee that the strategies of all vertices converge to a strict Nash equilibrium under the EUT and the FE. Finally, the simulation results not only evaluate the influence of FE on the overall cover level of networks but also demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of our proposed algorithm compared with the existing bounded rationality algorithm on representative networks and standard benchmark.

查看原文本刊更多论文

前景理论下网络顶点覆盖的框架效应

顶点覆盖（VC）问题是一个重要的组合优化问题，有着广泛的应用。在本文中，我们从博弈论的角度研究了解决顶点覆盖（VC）问题的现有工作；这些工作将网络中的每个顶点视为完全理性的玩家。相比之下，我们考虑了玩家主观行为的影响，即每个玩家不一定是完全理性的。首先，我们建立了预期效用理论（EUT）和前景理论框架效应（FE）下的博弈模型。其次，我们分析了 EUT 和 FE 下的 VC 与博弈模型之间的关系。第三，我们提出了一种宽松的贪婪行为算法，并证明了我们提出的算法可以保证所有顶点的策略都收敛到 EUT 和 FE 下的严格纳什均衡。最后，仿真结果不仅评估了 FE 对网络整体覆盖水平的影响，还在代表性网络和标准基准上证明了我们提出的算法与现有有界理性算法相比的有效性和优越性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

求助全文

约1分钟内获得全文求助全文

来源期刊

IEEE Systems Journal 工程技术-电信学

CiteScore

9.80

自引率

6.80%

发文量

572

审稿时长

4.9 months

期刊介绍： This publication provides a systems-level, focused forum for application-oriented manuscripts that address complex systems and system-of-systems of national and global significance. It intends to encourage and facilitate cooperation and interaction among IEEE Societies with systems-level and systems engineering interest, and to attract non-IEEE contributors and readers from around the globe. Our IEEE Systems Council job is to address issues in new ways that are not solvable in the domains of the existing IEEE or other societies or global organizations. These problems do not fit within traditional hierarchical boundaries. For example, disaster response such as that triggered by Hurricane Katrina, tsunamis, or current volcanic eruptions is not solvable by pure engineering solutions. We need to think about changing and enlarging the paradigm to include systems issues.