When should the regulator be left alone in the commons? How fishing cooperatives can help ameliorate inefficiencies

IF 4.6 Q2 MATERIALS SCIENCE, BIOMATERIALS
Juan Rosas-Munoz , Ana Espinola-Arredondo , Felix Munoz-Garcia
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引用次数: 0

Abstract

This paper examines a common-pool resource where quotas and fines are set by a regulator, an artisanal organization (cooperative), or both. We analyze the interaction between these two regulatory agencies under a flexible policy regime, where quotas and fines can be revised across periods, and under an inflexible policy regime, where they cannot. We show that inefficiencies arise in the inflexible regime, but they are reduced when the two agencies coexist. Overall, we demonstrate that the artisanal organization may be preferred when environmental damages are low, but the regulator may be preferable otherwise.

何时应让监管者独享公共资源?渔业合作社如何帮助改善效率低下问题
本文研究了一种由监管机构、手工组织(合作社)或两者共同设定配额和罚款的共有资源。我们分析了这两个监管机构在灵活政策制度和非灵活政策制度下的互动情况。前者规定配额和罚款可以跨期修改,而后者规定配额和罚款不能跨期修改。我们发现,在缺乏灵活性的制度下,会出现效率低下的情况,但当两个机构同时存在时,效率就会降低。总之,我们证明,当环境损害较低时,个体组织可能更受欢迎,但在其他情况下,监管机构可能更受欢迎。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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来源期刊
ACS Applied Bio Materials
ACS Applied Bio Materials Chemistry-Chemistry (all)
CiteScore
9.40
自引率
2.10%
发文量
464
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