{"title":"Sudden stop with local currency debt","authors":"Siming Liu , Chang Ma , Hewei Shen","doi":"10.1016/j.jinteco.2024.103888","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><p>Over the past two decades, emerging market economies have improved their liability structures by increasing the share of their debt denominated in local currency. This paper introduces a local currency debt (i.e., in units of aggregate consumption) into a sudden stop model and explores how this alternative structure sheds new perspectives on financial regulations. Decentralized agents do not internalize the effects of their portfolio decisions on financial amplification and undervalue the insurance benefit of using local currency debt. However, due to debt-deflation incentives and the cost of buying insurance, a discretionary planner is reluctant to issue local currency debts, and capital controls are primarily used to restrict credit volumes. In contrast, a social planner with commitment would promise a higher future payoff to obtain a more favorable bond price. The capital control under commitment encourages borrowing in local currency, mitigates the severity of crises, and improves welfare relative to laissez-faire.</p></div>","PeriodicalId":16276,"journal":{"name":"Journal of International Economics","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.8000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of International Economics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022199624000126","RegionNum":1,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
Over the past two decades, emerging market economies have improved their liability structures by increasing the share of their debt denominated in local currency. This paper introduces a local currency debt (i.e., in units of aggregate consumption) into a sudden stop model and explores how this alternative structure sheds new perspectives on financial regulations. Decentralized agents do not internalize the effects of their portfolio decisions on financial amplification and undervalue the insurance benefit of using local currency debt. However, due to debt-deflation incentives and the cost of buying insurance, a discretionary planner is reluctant to issue local currency debts, and capital controls are primarily used to restrict credit volumes. In contrast, a social planner with commitment would promise a higher future payoff to obtain a more favorable bond price. The capital control under commitment encourages borrowing in local currency, mitigates the severity of crises, and improves welfare relative to laissez-faire.
期刊介绍：
The Journal of International Economics is intended to serve as the primary outlet for theoretical and empirical research in all areas of international economics. These include, but are not limited to the following: trade patterns, commercial policy; international institutions; exchange rates; open economy macroeconomics; international finance; international factor mobility. The Journal especially encourages the submission of articles which are empirical in nature, or deal with issues of open economy macroeconomics and international finance. Theoretical work submitted to the Journal should be original in its motivation or modelling structure. Empirical analysis should be based on a theoretical framework, and should be capable of replication.
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