Representation in action

IF 0.7 2区哲学 0 PHILOSOPHY

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2024-01-16 DOI:10.1111/ejop.12932

Alec Hinshelwood

引用次数: 0

Abstract

When one is intentionally doing something, one represents that thing as a goal to be accomplished. One represents it practically. How should we characterize this practical representation further? In this paper, I argue that when one is intentionally doing something, one's representation of it as a goal to be accomplished must also be knowledge that one is intentionally doing that thing. And I argue that this knowledge must itself be one's intentionally doing that thing. I aim to show, then, that insofar as representing practically just is knowing practically, it is equally acting intentionally.

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行动中的代表性

当一个人有意去做某件事时，他就会把这件事当作一个要完成的目标。这就是实际表述。我们应该如何进一步描述这种实际表征呢？在本文中，我认为，当一个人有意做某件事情时，他将其表征为一个要完成的目标，这也必须是他有意做这件事的知识。而且我认为，这种知识本身必须是一个人有意在做的事情。因此，我的目的是要证明，只要实践表征就是实践认知，它就同样是有意为之的行为。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY PHILOSOPHY-

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： ''Founded by Mark Sacks in 1993, the European Journal of Philosophy has come to occupy a distinctive and highly valued place amongst the philosophical journals. The aim of EJP has been to bring together the best work from those working within the "analytic" and "continental" traditions, and to encourage connections between them, without diluting their respective priorities and concerns. This has enabled EJP to publish a wide range of material of the highest standard from philosophers across the world, reflecting the best thinking from a variety of philosophical perspectives, in a way that is accessible to all of them.''