{"title":"Game-Theoretic Specificity of a Competitive Allocation of the Frequency Spectrum","authors":"V. S. Kaplan, N. M. Novikova, I. I. Pospelova","doi":"10.1134/s1064230723060059","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<h3 data-test=\"abstract-sub-heading\">Abstract</h3><p>We consider the problem of developing and optimizing the rules of the spectrum auction. One-sided sealed-bid spectrum auctions are studied. Two types of pricing are compared theoretically: the first-price and the second-price. А game model of the auction with free riders is constructed. A free rider uses frequencies purchased by another such participant for free. All Nash equilibria of the obtained games are found and represented in an analytical form. The significant difference between games with all free riders and games with at least one ordinary player is shown. It is proved that when players eliminate their dominated strategies, the resulting auction price of the lot is determined by its value for ordinary players. In the case when all players are free riders, the price is equal to the minimal bid price. The influence of the information the participants have about their partners’ values of a lot on the outcome of the game is discussed. The theoretically obtained properties are in agreement with the results of the experiments presented for spectrum auctions in the scientific literature.</p>","PeriodicalId":50223,"journal":{"name":"Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International","volume":"12 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2024-01-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Journal of Computer and Systems Sciences International","FirstCategoryId":"94","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1134/s1064230723060059","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"计算机科学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
We consider the problem of developing and optimizing the rules of the spectrum auction. One-sided sealed-bid spectrum auctions are studied. Two types of pricing are compared theoretically: the first-price and the second-price. А game model of the auction with free riders is constructed. A free rider uses frequencies purchased by another such participant for free. All Nash equilibria of the obtained games are found and represented in an analytical form. The significant difference between games with all free riders and games with at least one ordinary player is shown. It is proved that when players eliminate their dominated strategies, the resulting auction price of the lot is determined by its value for ordinary players. In the case when all players are free riders, the price is equal to the minimal bid price. The influence of the information the participants have about their partners’ values of a lot on the outcome of the game is discussed. The theoretically obtained properties are in agreement with the results of the experiments presented for spectrum auctions in the scientific literature.
期刊介绍：
Journal of Computer and System Sciences International is a journal published in collaboration with the Russian Academy of Sciences. It covers all areas of control theory and systems. The journal features papers on the theory and methods of control, as well as papers devoted to the study, design, modeling, development, and application of new control systems. The journal publishes papers that reflect contemporary research and development in the field of control. Particular attention is given to applications of computer methods and technologies to control theory and control engineering. The journal publishes proceedings of international scientific conferences in the form of collections of regular journal articles and reviews by top experts on topical problems of modern studies in control theory.
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