Sectors versus borders: interest group cleavages and struggles over corporate governance in the age of asset management

IF 3.2 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Socio-Economic Review Pub Date : 2024-01-09 DOI:10.1093/ser/mwad072

Dustin Voss

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引用次数: 0

Abstract

Universally invested asset managers like BlackRock have established a dominant position in equity markets around the globe. While extant contributions have explored their voting behaviour and role in shaping corporate governance at the firm level, less is known about their potential to build interest coalitions with other business groups, and their leverage over state-level corporate governance institutions. This article investigates conflict over a far-reaching reform to co-determination in Germany. Qualitative content analysis of over 100 stakeholder statements yields that asset managers forge coalitions with short-term-oriented investors to abolish key tenets of corporatist institutions. However, a domestic countercoalition of financial and non-financial firms prevented momentous institutional change. This article improves our understanding of international asset managers’ preferences and highlights coalition building as a key determinant of the political power of international finance. By aligning the costs of institutional change for incumbents, corporatist institutions continue to act as shields against financialization.

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部门与边界：资产管理时代的利益集团分裂与公司治理之争

贝莱德（BlackRock）等普遍投资的资产管理公司已在全球股票市场占据主导地位。虽然现有文献探讨了它们在公司层面的投票行为和影响公司治理的作用，但对它们与其他商业集团建立利益联盟的潜力以及它们对国家级公司治理机构的影响力却知之甚少。本文研究了德国一项影响深远的共同决策改革所引发的冲突。通过对 100 多份利益相关者声明的定性内容分析发现，资产管理公司与短期投资者结成联盟，以废除公司治理机构的主要原则。然而，由金融和非金融企业组成的国内反联盟阻止了重大的制度变革。本文加深了我们对国际资产管理公司偏好的理解，并强调建立联盟是决定国际金融政治力量的关键因素。通过调整在位者的制度变革成本，公司主义制度继续充当抵御金融化的盾牌。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Socio-Economic Review Multiple-

CiteScore

6.80

自引率

10.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： Originating in the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics (SASE), Socio-Economic Review (SER) is part of a broader movement in the social sciences for the rediscovery of the socio-political foundations of the economy. Devoted to the advancement of socio-economics, it deals with the analytical, political and moral questions arising at the intersection between economy and society. Articles in SER explore how the economy is or should be governed by social relations, institutional rules, political decisions, and cultural values. They also consider how the economy in turn affects the society of which it is part, for example by breaking up old institutional forms and giving rise to new ones. The domain of the journal is deliberately broadly conceived, so new variations to its general theme may be discovered and editors can learn from the papers that readers submit. To enhance international dialogue, Socio-Economic Review accepts the submission of translated articles that are simultaneously published in a language other than English. In pursuit of its program, SER is eager to promote interdisciplinary dialogue between sociology, economics, political science and moral philosophy, through both empirical and theoretical work. Empirical papers may be qualitative as well as quantitative, and theoretical papers will not be confined to deductive model-building. Papers suggestive of more generalizable insights into the economy as a domain of social action will be preferred over narrowly specialized work. While firmly committed to the highest standards of scholarly excellence, Socio-Economic Review encourages discussion of the practical and ethical dimensions of economic action, with the intention to contribute to both the advancement of social science and the building of a good economy in a good society.