The Structure of Selfhood and Affection in Husserl’s Phenomenology and the Praxis of Mindfulness

Abstract

In this article, I will elaborate what kind of theory of subjectivity is implied in the practice of mindfulness. This article attempts to explain Husserl’s accounts of the constitution of selfhood (as the person) and of affection in our life-stream of consciousness to develop a more complete view of “who we are” in the practice of mindfulness. The practice of mindfulness provides a path to the well-being of the person’s emotional life. What underlies the practice of mindfulness is a particular image of the human mind, which is not just a brain, but a whole person with a psychic life that includes various types of activity, passivity, and embodied emotion. Moreover, the person’s habituality can still be transformed through mental exercise. If we thoroughly understand the relevant relationships between attention, emotions, and affective feelings in our living experience, we can then further confirm, from the Husserlian phenomenological point of view, the benefits of practicing mindfulness for emotional regulation. Emotion is not only a matter of affective feeling, but is also cognitive and is combined with the function of reason.