The Incentives of Leaders in International Organizations: Evidence from the UN General Assembly

IF 1.5 3区社会学 Q2 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

International Interactions Pub Date : 2023-12-15 DOI:10.1080/03050629.2023.2288615

Alexander Baturo, Julia Gray

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Voters and selectorates tend to prioritize domestic policy, so when and why do national political leaders choose to spend their time at international organizations (IOs)? Heads of state only began ...

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国际组织领导人的激励机制：来自联合国大会的证据

选民和遴选者倾向于优先考虑国内政策，那么国家政治领导人何时以及为何会选择在国际组织（IOs）上花时间呢？国家元首们只是开始......

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来源期刊

International Interactions INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

7.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： International Interactions is a leading interdisciplinary journal that publishes original empirical, analytic, and theoretical studies of conflict and political economy. The journal has a particular interest in research that focuses upon the broad range of relations and interactions among the actors in the global system. Relevant topics include ethnic and religious conflict, interstate and intrastate conflict, conflict resolution, conflict management, economic development, regional integration, trade relations, institutions, globalization, terrorism, and geopolitical analyses.