Teoria da Argumentação para a concepção do Direito como integridade de Dworkin: Uma impossibilidade?

Abstract

The article aims to verify the possibility of an argumentation theory within the framework of Ronald Dworkin’s theory of Law as Integrity. The research is based on a literature re-view based on the analysis of the epistemological contradiction between the current theories of legal argumentation and the theory of Law as Integrity, based on Hans-Georg Gadamer and Ronald Dworkin. We conclude that, despite this contradiction, a theory of argu-mentation is possible within Dworkin’s theory, as long as the logic of developing a previous and methodical path to reach a metaphysical truth is overcome. Without illusions or relativism, we propose the acceptance of Law as Integrity, founded on hermeneutic bases, as an alternative for the strengthening of an argumentative process within the scope of a Democratic State of Law.