Discrimination and Deterrence with Enforcer Liability

IF 1 3区社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS

American Law and Economics Review Pub Date : 2020-06-03 DOI:10.1093/aler/ahaa007

Mungan M.

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Taste-based discrimination (i.e. discrimination due to racist preferences) receives more attention than statistical discrimination in the enforcement literature, because the latter allows enforcers to increase their “success rates.” I show here that when enforcers’ incentives can be altered via liabilities and rewards, all types of discrimination reduce deterrence. Moreover, adverse effects of statistical discrimination on deterrence are more persistent than similar effects due to taste-based discrimination. I identify crime minimizing liabilities and rewards when enforcers engage in racial discrimination and consider the robustness of the analysis in alternative settings.

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歧视与威慑与执行者责任

在执法文献中，基于品味的歧视(即种族主义偏好造成的歧视)比统计上的歧视更受关注，因为后者可以提高执法人员的“成功率”。我在这里表明，当执法者的动机可以通过责任和奖励来改变时，所有类型的歧视都会降低威慑作用。此外，统计歧视对威慑的不利影响比基于品味的歧视造成的类似影响更持久。当执法者从事种族歧视时，我确定犯罪将责任和回报最小化，并考虑在其他环境中分析的稳健性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

American Law and Economics Review Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The rise of the field of law and economics has been extremely rapid over the last 25 years. Among important developments of the 1990s has been the founding of the American Law and Economics Association. The creation and rapid expansion of the ALEA and the creation of parallel associations in Europe, Latin America, and Canada attest to the growing acceptance of the economic perspective on law by judges, practitioners, and policy-makers.