{"title":"The Effects of a Day off from Retail Price Competition: Evidence on Consumer Behavior and Firm Performance in Gasoline Retailing","authors":"Øystein Foros, Mai Nguyen-Ones, Frode Steen","doi":"10.1080/13571516.2020.1843381","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p><b>Abstract</b></p><p>First, we analyze how regular days off from competition and a time-dependent price pattern affect firm performance. Second, we examine the effects on firms' profitability from consumers’ changing search- and timing behavior. We use microdata from gasoline retailing in Norway. From 2004 to 2017, firms practiced an industry-wide day off from competition, starting on Mondays at noon, by increasing prices to a common level given by the recommended prices (decided and published in advance). In turn, a foreseeable low-price window is open before every restoration. During the data period, we observe an additional weekly restoration on Thursdays at noon. The additional day off from competition increases firm performance. As expected, a conventional price search of where to buy reduces firms’ profitability. In contrast, consumers who are aware of the cycle and spend effort on when to buy have a positive impact on firms’ profitability. If consumers spend effort on when to buy, they attempt to tank during low price windows. By its very nature, this shrink consumers’ ability to compare prices at several outlets. Consequently, more attention to when to buy may soften price competition.</p>","PeriodicalId":45470,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of the Economics of Business","volume":"39 2-3","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":1.9000,"publicationDate":"2020-11-09","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of the Economics of Business","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/13571516.2020.1843381","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q3","JCRName":"BUSINESS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
Abstract
First, we analyze how regular days off from competition and a time-dependent price pattern affect firm performance. Second, we examine the effects on firms' profitability from consumers’ changing search- and timing behavior. We use microdata from gasoline retailing in Norway. From 2004 to 2017, firms practiced an industry-wide day off from competition, starting on Mondays at noon, by increasing prices to a common level given by the recommended prices (decided and published in advance). In turn, a foreseeable low-price window is open before every restoration. During the data period, we observe an additional weekly restoration on Thursdays at noon. The additional day off from competition increases firm performance. As expected, a conventional price search of where to buy reduces firms’ profitability. In contrast, consumers who are aware of the cycle and spend effort on when to buy have a positive impact on firms’ profitability. If consumers spend effort on when to buy, they attempt to tank during low price windows. By its very nature, this shrink consumers’ ability to compare prices at several outlets. Consequently, more attention to when to buy may soften price competition.
期刊介绍：
International Journal of the Economics of Business presents original, peer reviewed research in economics that is clearly applicable to business or related public policy problems or issues. The term "business" is used in its widest sense to encompass both public and private sector—governmental, private non-profit and cooperative organizations, as well as profit-seeking enterprises. International Journal of the Economics of Business carries papers relating to three main spheres: The organization—to analyse and aid decision making and the internal organization of the business; The industry—to analyse how businesses interact and evolve within and across industries.
求助内容：
应助结果提醒方式：
京公网安备 11010802042870号
