Embodied Experience, Embodied Advantage, and the Inclusion of Transgender Athletes in Competitive Sport: Expanded Framework, Criticisms, and Policy Recommendations

Abstract

ABSTRACTIn a previous paper entitled ‘Beyond Physiology: Embodied Experience, Embodied Advantage, and the Inclusion of Transgender Athletes in Competitive Sport,’ we claim that analyses of the inclusion or exclusion of transgender athletes in competitive sport must go beyond physiological criteria and incorporate the notions of embodied experience and embodied advantage. Our stance has recently been challenged as impractical and excessively exclusionary. In this paper, we address these challenges and build upon them to expand on the policy implications of our original framework, highlighting that embodied experience and embodied advantage heavily influence athletic performance. We differentiate competitive fairness from justice to, with an emphasis on the inclusion of transgender women in competitive sport, formulate a justice-based argument for maximizing inclusion. Afterward, we identify ideal and nonideal policy recommendations connected to our analysis of embodied experience and embodied advantage. We ultimately advocate for a qualified inclusion that assesses potential residual (physiological and embodied) advantages while striving for justice and competitive fairness.KEYWORDS: transgender athletesembodied experienceinclusion, justicecompetitive fairness Disclosure statementNo potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).Notes1. See Birrell and Cole (Citation1990) and, among others, Herman (Citation1976) and Lautens (Citation1976).2. Moreover, one may wonder whether philosophy by itself can make sound contributions to policymaking (Wolff Citation2019).3. We acknowledge that Loland’s account of competitive fairness, especially his distinction between stable and dynamic conditions, clashes with some of the policy recommendations reviewed below. However, it is possible to draw on Loland’s fair play opportunity principle without also accepting (some of) his further refinements and applications of the notion. See Camporesi (Citation2020); Camporesi and Hämäläinen (Citation2021); Hämäläinen (Citation2012).4. Also see Berg (Citation2015), (Citation2018).5. One year after the publication of English’s work, Iris Marion Young (Citation1979), another feminist philosopher who formulated a justice-based argument for sex segregation in sport, expanded on this argument. By drawing on Simone de Beauvoir, she argued that sport engagement allows individuals to flourish. Thus, a lack of participation in sport prevents them from developing capacities crucial to leading fully human lives. For an analysis of feminist approaches to sport, see Burke Citation2015.6. This concept also plays a key role in the works of Young (Citation1979). For a detailed analysis of this concept, see Falbo (Citation2008).7. As Schultz et al. (Citation2022) expound, data from communities with transgender inclusive policies indicate that ‘the inclusion of trans athletes at the high school level has had no negative impact on sport participation or athletic achievements for cisgender women and girls’ (22). Moreover, they note that evidence seems to suggest that ‘[t]rans inclusion does not hurt cisgender participation; it improves it’ (22).8. For a criticism of this proposal, see Pike (Citation2023).9. English is optimistic about the possibility of approaching the ideal because people have long embraced sport due to its developmental potential. In fact, she hopes that ‘the entry of women into sports could foster a reawakening to these values, which are widely shared but have been lost lately in the shuffle of big business sports. Some such reawakening is necessary if ability groupings are to be effective’ (English Citation1978, 274).10. As one of the anonymous reviewers noted, this approach seems to only apply to transgender people who affirm the binary, ignoring those who come under the non-binary umbrella. However, this is not necessarily the case. Non-binary athletes who seek to enter competitive sport could well request entry in their preferred category and be subject to the same embodied experience and embodied advantage eligibility criteria as transgender athletes. For instance, our framework would support the inclusion of Canadian soccer player Quinn in the women’s category.11. This aligns with the International Olympic Committee’s recent framework on fairness, inclusion, and nondiscrimination on the basis of gender identity and sex variations.