Founder involvement in CEO turnover

IF 3.6 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Strategic Change-Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance Pub Date : 2023-05-29 DOI:10.1002/jsc.2547

Oskar Kowalewski, Aleksandra Majda-Kariozen, Blazej Socha

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract We study the role of a company founder in the internal governance of firms. Using a sample of 484 CEO turnovers for 2000–2015, we establish that CEOs are fired for poor performance. However, the likelihood of a poor‐performing founder‐CEO being fired is lower than that of an outsider CEO. Moreover, having a founder as a member of the executive or supervisory board decreases the likelihood that a CEO will be dismissed for poor performance. Similarly, founder ownership may have the same effect on CEO turnover. Finally, being a founder does not guarantee a poor‐performing CEO a chairman position after being fired.

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创始人参与CEO更替

摘要本文研究公司创始人在公司内部治理中的作用。利用2000-2015年484名CEO离职的样本，我们确定CEO因表现不佳而被解雇。然而，表现不佳的创始人兼首席执行官被解雇的可能性低于外部首席执行官。此外，让创始人担任执行或监事会成员，降低了首席执行官因表现不佳而被解雇的可能性。同样，创始人所有权对CEO离职也有同样的影响。最后，作为创始人并不能保证表现不佳的首席执行官在被解雇后仍能担任董事长。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Strategic Change-Briefings in Entrepreneurial Finance BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

6.70

自引率

10.70%

发文量