{"title":"An Auction Algorithm for Market Equilibrium with Weak Gross Substitute Demands","authors":"Jugal Garg, Edin Husić, László A. Végh","doi":"10.1145/3624558","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We consider the Arrow–Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents’ demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands assuming the availability of a price update oracle. We exhibit specific implementations of such an oracle for WGS demands with bounded price elasticities and for Gale demand systems.","PeriodicalId":42216,"journal":{"name":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":1.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-09-14","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1145/3624558","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"COMPUTER SCIENCE, INTERDISCIPLINARY APPLICATIONS","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
We consider the Arrow–Debreu exchange market model under the assumption that the agents’ demands satisfy the weak gross substitutes (WGS) property. We present a simple auction algorithm that obtains an approximate market equilibrium for WGS demands assuming the availability of a price update oracle. We exhibit specific implementations of such an oracle for WGS demands with bounded price elasticities and for Gale demand systems.
期刊介绍:
The ACM Transactions on Economics and Computation welcomes submissions of the highest quality that concern the intersection of computer science and economics. Of interest to the journal is any topic relevant to both economists and computer scientists, including but not limited to the following: Agents in networks Algorithmic game theory Computation of equilibria Computational social choice Cost of strategic behavior and cost of decentralization ("price of anarchy") Design and analysis of electronic markets Economics of computational advertising Electronic commerce Learning in games and markets Mechanism design Paid search auctions Privacy Recommendation / reputation / trust systems Systems resilient against malicious agents.