Not welcome anymore: the effect of electoral incentives on the reception of refugees

IF 3.1 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Geography Pub Date : 2023-02-20 DOI:10.1093/jeg/lbad002

Matteo Gamalerio, Margherita Negri

引用次数: 0

Abstract

Abstract Do electoral incentives affect immigration policies? Exploiting the Italian system for refugees’ reception and data from Italian municipalities, we show that proximity to elections reduces the probability that a municipality applies to host a refugee center by 26%, despite the economic benefits arising from these centers. Low electoral competition and high shares of extreme-right voters drive the effect. Our results are rationalized by a theoretical model and can explain the unequal distribution of refugees across and within countries.

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不再受欢迎:选举激励对接纳难民的影响

选举激励会影响移民政策吗?利用意大利的难民接收系统和意大利市政当局的数据，我们发现，尽管这些中心带来了经济效益，但靠近选举的地方，市政当局申请收容难民中心的可能性降低了26%。低选举竞争和极右翼选民的高份额推动了这种效应。我们的研究结果被一个理论模型合理化，可以解释难民在国家之间和国家内部的不平等分布。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Geography Multiple-

CiteScore

5.40

自引率

6.90%

发文量

期刊介绍： The aims of the Journal of Economic Geography are to redefine and reinvigorate the intersection between economics and geography, and to provide a world-class journal in the field. The journal is steered by a distinguished team of Editors and an Editorial Board, drawn equally from the two disciplines. It publishes original academic research and discussion of the highest scholarly standard in the field of ''economic geography'' broadly defined. Submitted papers are refereed, and are evaluated on the basis of their creativity, quality of scholarship, and contribution to advancing understanding of the geographic nature of economic systems and global economic change.