The Design of Intermediary Mechanism in E-Commerce Trust-Building and Solutions to Its Realization Condition

2007 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management Pub Date : 2007-06-09 DOI:10.1109/ICSSSM.2007.4280228

Wei Ming-xia, J. Dan

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引用次数: 2

Abstract

Trust risk has become one of the main barriers to online trading, and how to design an effective trust-building mechanism has become the key to the further development of e-commerce. According to e-commerce's character of systematic trust and cause of risk, an online trading stage game model revolving intermediary organization is established, and corresponding optimal behavior chain is constructed; based on this, find solutions to the realization condition of optimal behavior chain, and disclose the relationship between parameters required by an effective intermediary mechanism in e-commerce trust-building. This study shows: the price of digital ID and fine coefficient to the fraud are two key parameters in the operation of intermediary mechanism; the condition for effective operation of intermediary mechanism is that the price of digital ID is less than or equal to the discount value of honest income expectation in each game stage, and the fine coefficient to the fraud is less than or equal to the ratio of expectation present value of honest income in each game stage to the maximum of average social interests.

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电子商务信任建设中的中介机制设计及其实现条件解决方案

信任风险已成为网络交易的主要障碍之一，如何设计有效的信任构建机制成为电子商务进一步发展的关键。根据电子商务系统信任的特点和风险产生的原因，建立了以中介组织为中心的网上交易阶段博弈模型，构建了相应的最优行为链;在此基础上，求解最优行为链的实现条件，揭示电子商务信任建设中有效中介机制所需参数之间的关系。研究表明:数字身份证的价格和欺诈的精细系数是中介机制运行中的两个关键参数;中介机制有效运行的条件是:数字身份的价格小于等于每个博弈阶段的诚实收入预期贴现值，对欺诈行为的罚款系数小于等于每个博弈阶段的诚实收入预期现值与社会平均利益最大值之比。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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2007 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management

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