Security-Enhanced Serial Communications

J. White, Alexander Beall, Joseph Maurio, Dane Fichter, M. Davis, Zachary Birnbaum
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Abstract

Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are widely used by critical infrastructure and are ubiquitous in numerous industries including telecommunications, petrochemical, and manufacturing. ICS are at a high risk of cyber attack given their internet accessibility, inherent lack of security, deployment timelines, and criticality. A unique challenge in ICS security is the prevalence of serial communication buses and other non-TCP/IP communications protocols. The communication protocols used within serial buses often lack authentication and integrity protections, leaving them vulnerable to spoofing and replay attacks. The bandwidth constraints and prevalence of legacy hardware in these systems prevent the use of modern message authentication and integrity techniques, such as those provided by Transport Layer Security (TLS). Our approach seeks to address the challenges of providing authentication to serial communications while keeping the existing serial communications bus in place and adding minimal hardware. Here we demonstrate the integration of field-programmable gate arrays (FPGAs) on the bus to inject message authentication codes into an out-of-band (OOB) communications channel, leveraging Power Line Communication (PLC) techniques. Our results show that simple solutions can be integrated into existing serial communications to provide necessary security features in critically important systems. The presented solution is inexpensive, scales well, is modular and extensible, and has low temporal overhead. Providing authenticated serial communications for critical infrastructure systems will improve their ability to resist cyber attacks.
安全增强的串行通信
工业控制系统(ICS)广泛应用于关键基础设施,在电信、石化和制造业等众多行业中无处不在。考虑到ICS的互联网可访问性、固有的安全性缺乏、部署时间表和重要性,它们面临着很高的网络攻击风险。ICS安全的一个独特挑战是串行通信总线和其他非tcp /IP通信协议的流行。串行总线中使用的通信协议通常缺乏身份验证和完整性保护,使它们容易受到欺骗和重放攻击。在这些系统中,带宽限制和遗留硬件的流行阻碍了现代消息身份验证和完整性技术的使用,例如传输层安全性(TLS)提供的那些技术。我们的方法旨在解决为串行通信提供身份验证的挑战,同时保持现有串行通信总线的位置并添加最少的硬件。在这里,我们展示了现场可编程门阵列(fpga)在总线上的集成,以利用电力线通信(PLC)技术将消息认证码注入带外(OOB)通信通道。我们的研究结果表明,简单的解决方案可以集成到现有的串行通信中,以在至关重要的系统中提供必要的安全功能。所提出的解决方案价格低廉,可扩展性好,模块化和可扩展,并且具有较低的时间开销。为关键基础设施系统提供经过认证的串行通信将提高其抵御网络攻击的能力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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