Designing fuzzy utility-based double auctions using particle swarm optimization algorithm

M. A. Rigi, S. Mohammadi, Morteza Delgir
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引用次数: 1

Abstract

Auction refers to arbitrary resource allocation problems with self-motivated participants: Auctioneer and bidders. Double auction is a kind of auctions with multiple buyers and sellers who trade multiple goods. In double auction each trader submits his bid (price and quantity) to the auctioneer. Then the auctioneer collects all of the bids and tries to assign some buyers to some sellers according to their preferences in a way that the whole of the market reaches its maximum utility, this is called a mechanism. In a traditional double auction market each bid is a linear utility function, but in real world, behavior of buyers and sellers is not linear, therefore we propose a fuzzy non-linear utility function for traders because traders (like all humans) are thinking and making decisions in a fuzzy way. Our aim is to design an optimal double auction mechanism. To find optimum in this non-linear optimization problem, we use particle swarm optimization (PSO).
基于粒子群优化算法的模糊效用双拍卖设计
拍卖是指具有自我激励的参与者:拍卖人与竞买人之间的任意资源分配问题。双重拍卖是指交易多种商品的多个买家和卖家进行的拍卖。在双重拍卖中,每个交易商向拍卖人提交他的出价(价格和数量)。然后,拍卖师收集所有的出价,并试图根据他们的偏好将一些买家分配给一些卖家,以使整个市场达到其最大效用,这被称为机制。在传统的双拍卖市场中,每个出价都是一个线性效用函数,但在现实世界中,买卖双方的行为不是线性的,因此我们提出了一个模糊的非线性效用函数,因为交易者(和所有人一样)都是以模糊的方式思考和决策的。我们的目标是设计一个最优的双重拍卖机制。为了在非线性优化问题中找到最优解,我们使用了粒子群算法(PSO)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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