Ideal Types and Behavioral Hypotheses: Public Law, Max Weber and the New Public Administration

Abstract

Abstract:The article challenges the assumptions that current public administration is a direct application of Max Weber's ideal type of rational-legal bureaucracy. The prevailing theory of public administration is the Rational Behavioral Hypothesis which this article argues is an instrumentalized version of Weber's ideal type and as such it presumes, invalidly, the attributes of legal-rationality. Of the majority of civil services across the world employing an estimated half a billion officials, Weberian criteria of efficiency, rationality, and impartiality to politicans and citizens alike is lacking. Yet despite these failings bureaucratic practice is assumed to be Weberian. The author argues that the Rational Behavioral Hypothesis has to be replaced by the ‘Administrative Behavior hypothesis’ which is taken from Herbert Simon. Bruce Ackerman's account of bureaucracy as the fourth pillar of modern constitutionalism is criticised for its reliance on the cultural formation of bureaucratic elites. The role of New Public Management and the Neo-Weberian State in public administration are assessed.