{"title":"An Empirical Account of Mind","authors":"D. M. Taylor","doi":"10.1017/S0080443600000996","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"What could an empirical theory of the Mind be? Surely one which demonstrated that questions about the existence of minds were empirical questions – to be decided by observation, by the senses. This in turn would require an explanation of the meaning of statements about minds or mental states in terms referring to observable events, states and objects.","PeriodicalId":322312,"journal":{"name":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","volume":"84 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1975-03-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1017/S0080443600000996","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 1
Abstract
What could an empirical theory of the Mind be? Surely one which demonstrated that questions about the existence of minds were empirical questions – to be decided by observation, by the senses. This in turn would require an explanation of the meaning of statements about minds or mental states in terms referring to observable events, states and objects.