{"title":"Better Than Risk-Free: Do Reserve Premiums Crowd out Bank Lending?","authors":"R. Kim","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3318432","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"When the Federal Reserve first paid interest on excess reserves (IOER) in October 2008, it presented a choice that banks had not previously faced. Banks could invest capital in precautionary excess reserves and earn a risk-free rate \"better than\" the treasury rate, or lend and earn a higher, but riskier interest rate. One-stage and two-stage panel estimations show \"reserve premiums\" are associated with a 6% ($601.5B) reduction in bank lending after accounting for increased lending due to QE. Results support the growing importance of policy discretion as IOER inverted interest rate incentives for counter-cyclical lending to that of cyclical lending.","PeriodicalId":145273,"journal":{"name":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-06-26","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":null,"platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Monetary Economics: Central Banks - Policies & Impacts eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3318432","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2
Abstract
When the Federal Reserve first paid interest on excess reserves (IOER) in October 2008, it presented a choice that banks had not previously faced. Banks could invest capital in precautionary excess reserves and earn a risk-free rate "better than" the treasury rate, or lend and earn a higher, but riskier interest rate. One-stage and two-stage panel estimations show "reserve premiums" are associated with a 6% ($601.5B) reduction in bank lending after accounting for increased lending due to QE. Results support the growing importance of policy discretion as IOER inverted interest rate incentives for counter-cyclical lending to that of cyclical lending.