List of Contributors

J. Green, S. Whimster, G. Poggi, Hubert Treiber, H. Orihara, G. Dilcher
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Abstract

Abstract:Political scientists are not generally accustomed to treating Max Weber's unusual account of democracy–plebiscitary leader democracy–as a genuine democratic theory. The typical objection is that Weber's account of democracy in terms of the generation of charismatic leadership is not really a democratic theory at all, because it contains no positive account of popular power: specifically, that it presents democracy in such a fashion that there is no capacity for the People to participate in the articulation and ratification of the norms, laws and policies governing the conduct of public life. This essay argues that Weber's theory of plebiscitary leader democracy ought to be interpreted as rejecting, not any account of popular power, but only a traditional and still dominant vocal paradigm of popular power: one which assumes that popular power must refer to an authorial power to self-legislate the norms and conditions of public life, or at least to express substantive opinions, values and preferences about what kinds of decisions political leaders ought to be making. Properly understood, plebiscitary leader democracy embodies a novel, ocular paradigm of popular power according to which the object of popular power is the leader (not the law), the organ of popular power is the People's gaze (not its voice), and the critical ideal associated with popular empowerment is the candor of leaders (not the autonomous authorship of laws). Thus, rather than abandon the concept of popular power, Weber's theory of democracy reinvents its meaning under conditions of mass society.
贡献者名单
摘要:政治学家通常不习惯于将马克斯·韦伯对民主的不同寻常的描述——公民投票领导民主——视为真正的民主理论。典型的反对意见是,韦伯从魅力型领导的产生这一角度对民主的描述根本就不是真正的民主理论,因为它没有包含对大众权力的积极描述:具体来说,它以这样一种方式呈现民主,即人民没有能力参与规范、法律和政策的表达和批准,这些规范、法律和政策管理着公共生活的行为。本文认为,韦伯的公民投票领导民主理论应该被解释为拒绝,而不是拒绝任何对人民权力的解释,而只是拒绝一种传统的、仍然占主导地位的人民权力的声音范式:这种范式假设人民权力必须指的是一种权威权力,这种权力可以自我立法公共生活的规范和条件,或者至少可以就政治领导人应该做出什么样的决定表达实质性的意见、价值观和偏好。正确理解,公民投票领导民主体现了一种新颖的、直观的人民权力范式,根据这种范式,人民权力的对象是领导人(而不是法律),人民权力的机关是人民的目光(而不是声音),与人民授权相关的关键理想是领导人的坦率(而不是法律的自主作者)。因此,韦伯的民主理论并没有抛弃大众权力的概念,而是在大众社会的条件下重新定义了它的意义。
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