The Effects of Partisan Polarization on the Bureaucracy

D. Spence
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引用次数: 2

Abstract

This essay reviews the law and political science literature addressing how polarization affects administrative agencies, and suggests opportunities for new scholarly inquiries that might help us fill in our understanding of the effects of polarization on the bureaucracy. While this scholarship has not yet generated consensus conclusions about the effects on the bureaucracy of increasingly polarized parties, we can make a couple of observations about its lessons so far. The first is that the early evidence suggests that agencies are neither as paralyzed nor as prone to ideologically extreme positions as are their political overseers, even if they sometimes have more ideological room to operate than they once did. The second observation is that polarization (particularly, congressional gridlock) nevertheless places increasing strain on agencies and courts, as the former face new problems within their jurisdiction without (or with less frequent and helpful) input from Congress, and the latter struggle to review those agency decisions. These struggles have important implications for the place of administrative agencies in the American constitutional design, implications that courts and scholars are beginning to address. The task here - tracing the effects of partisan polarization on administrative agencies - implicates age-old debates about the political control of agencies by politicians, and the extent to which agencies can (or should) evade political control. The academic literatures within which those debates are waged have long been fragmented, both substantively and methodologically. Within political science, these questions are taken up by scholars who occupy a variety of subfields, including bureaucratic politics, public administration, Congress, and the presidency. Each frames the problem from the perspective of a different institutional actor, and brings different methodological norms and preferences to the task. Among legal scholars, these questions fall mostly within administrative law scholarship, but administrative law scholars borrow selectively from social scientific analyses, all the while addressing the normative dimensions of this question more directly (and transparently) than most social scientists do. This essay explores how these frames influence the scholarship addressing the effects of polarization in a variety of ways, both analytical and normative.
党派分化对官僚制度的影响
本文回顾了关于两极分化如何影响行政机构的法律和政治学文献,并提出了新的学术研究机会,这可能有助于我们填补我们对两极分化对官僚机构影响的理解。虽然这方面的研究尚未就日益两极化的政党对官僚机构的影响得出共识结论,但我们可以对迄今为止的教训进行一些观察。首先,早期的证据表明,这些机构既不像它们的政治监督者那样瘫痪,也不像他们那样倾向于意识形态上的极端立场,即使它们有时比以前有更多的意识形态空间来运作。第二个观察是,两极分化(特别是国会僵局)给机构和法院带来了越来越大的压力,因为前者在其管辖范围内面临新的问题,而没有(或较少的)来自国会的投入,而后者则难以审查这些机构的决定。这些斗争对行政机构在美国宪法设计中的地位有着重要的影响,法院和学者们开始关注这些影响。这里的任务——追踪党派两极化对行政机构的影响——涉及到关于政治家对机构的政治控制以及机构可以(或应该)逃避政治控制的程度的古老辩论。长期以来,这些争论的学术文献在实质上和方法上都是支离破碎的。在政治科学中,这些问题被占据各种子领域的学者所研究,包括官僚政治、公共行政、国会和总统。每一种都是从不同的制度参与者的角度来构建问题,并为任务带来不同的方法规范和偏好。在法律学者中,这些问题大多属于行政法学术,但行政法学者有选择地借鉴社会科学分析,同时比大多数社会科学家更直接(和透明)地解决这个问题的规范维度。本文探讨了这些框架如何影响以各种分析和规范的方式解决两极分化影响的奖学金。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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