Attack Resilient Distributed Control for AC Microgrids with Distributed Robust State Estimation

Abstract

In this paper, we propose an attack resilient distributed control for islanded AC microgrid (MG) systems. The distributed control on an MG is implemented based on a sparse communication network where each agent only has access to the information of itself and the neighboring distributed generators (DGs). Although distributed control has several advantages compared with its centralized counterpart, the increased dependence on communication and lack of access to global information make it vulnerable to cyber threats from malicious entities. To increase the resiliency of the distributed control, we propose to incorporate a distributed robust state estimation scheme. In the proposed scheme, the voltage and frequency references are calculated based on the results of the distributed estimator instead of directly using the local measurements. The performance of the proposed attack resilient control approach is validated through simulation results on a test microgrid system under false data injection attack.