Crises, Liquidity Shocks, and Fire Sales at Commercial Banks

Nicole M. Boyson, Jean Helwege, J. Jindra
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引用次数: 41

Abstract

type="main"> If liquidity shortages cause financial crises, a lender of last resort can provide funds to banks facing potential fire sales. However, if funding problems primarily occur at banks with existing solvency problems, then government liquidity programs may not spur bank lending. We find that commercial bank funding does not typically dry up in a crisis, not even during the subprime crisis. Rather, weak banks are more likely to borrow less. Furthermore, banks rely more on deposits and newly issued equity than fire sales. When they do sell assets, they cherry pick assets in order to alleviate pressure from capital regulations.
商业银行的危机、流动性冲击和甩卖
如果流动性短缺导致金融危机,最后贷款人可以向面临可能贱卖的银行提供资金。然而,如果资金问题主要发生在存在偿付能力问题的银行,那么政府的流动性计划可能不会刺激银行放贷。我们发现,商业银行的资金通常不会在危机中枯竭,即使在次贷危机期间也是如此。相反,实力较弱的银行更有可能减少借贷。此外,银行更多地依赖于存款和新发行的股票,而不是甩卖。当他们出售资产时,他们会精心挑选资产,以减轻资本监管的压力。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
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