DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE DOCTRINE OF JOINT ACTIONS OF THE ISRAELI DEFENCE FORCES

Abstract

This paper has as its main focus the way in which the Israeli Joint warfighting doctrine has evolved in time, since the creation of the Jewish state, as well as the particularities and methods of improving the next stage of this type of doctrine, as outlined in the Momentum Plan released by the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF). The aim of the research is to assess whether the joint warfighting actions have given the IDF an edge in accomplishing the strategic objectives designed by the Israeli political leadership, as well as whether the next planned iteration of the Israeli joint warfighting doctrine, the Momentum Plan, is feasible and whether it has any vulnerabilities to address. The main methodological methods used in this paper are the case study of the conflicts where the IDF used joint warfighting actions as its main method of conducting operations, as well as the observation of actions that could prevent the Momentum Plan from achieving the desired results.